

Editor's foreword: This issue of the Journal features reports—both official and unofficial—on the Louisiana maneuvers. The general tone is critical; although praise was due in numerous instances, this magazine can fill no useful function in lauding units or individuals. That can be (and doubtless has been) done more authoritatively by commanders concerned. However, we do not toss brickbats for the pleasure of it. Our army is undergoing a phase of searching self-analysis which is both wholesome and timely. Far better that we expose our own faults now than have the enemy do it for us later.

A "battle." Troops are waiting for umpires to decide who won.



LOUISIANA HAYRIDE

By Garrett Underhill

Photographs from "Life," by Ralph Morse

A journalist casts a sharply critical eye at the maneuvers, and tells us many things which may be helpful.

The joint Louisiana maneuvers of the Second and Third Armies this year were thoroughly covered by the Fourth Estate. Uniformed and assigned to either Red or Blue armies in a combatant status, reporters attached themselves to military units, and were thus for the first time brought into interested and intimate contact with combat intelligence, reconnaissance, patrolling, and local security.

The conduct of units engaged in such work did not bear out the reputation Americans have as frontiersmen, hunters and scouts. In view of this outdoor tradition and the past months of small unit training, their execution of local security was particularly disappointing.

Along improved roads where heavy traffic moved there was no organization to prevent vehicles and personnel from running right through friendly outposts and into the hands of the enemy. Such ridiculous sights as a ½-ton weapons carrier with a caliber .50 machine gun attacking (at 30

mph) two parked scout cars and a light tank has no place in modern war. Neither has the spectacle of two Blue wire trucks traveling at such a clip that they were unable to stop before passing through a Blue rifle company and a Red reconnaissance platoon. However, there were innumerable instances where the situation had so changed as to absolve the lost vehicles and personnel of much blame for running into enemy lines.

A striking case in point concerns a problem wherein Blue cavalry had penetrated behind the Red right flank to a town called Zwolle, thus getting astride a north-south concrete road and separating Red Army HQ and some railheads from the main Red effort in the south. Red cavalry and armored formations south of Zwolle about-faced and went north to push the Blues out of the town. They parked half-tracks 1½ miles south of Zwolle on the concrete highway and swung to the right



After getting hopelessly intermixed with Red Cavalry at Zwolle, and after turning around to attack the center of town, Red tanks here meet a colored brigade moving up to reinforce the cavalry attack.

to attack along a parallel road. Meanwhile a Blue cavalry patrol worked in among the half-tracks and forced them back.

Subsequently, in the course of an hour, the Red half-tracks were passed by a northbound Red 6×6, various Red motorcyclists, a division artillery commander and party, a forward artillery observer, jeeps and miscellaneous other personnel. Some vehicles were even unaware that Zwolle's occupation had blocked the main road to Army HQ and Shreveport. All went through Red outposts without the slightest warning from the half-tracks, and were taken captive almost to a man.

Such indifference as these half-tracks displayed was common. No small number of officers and men outside of corps and division CP's had a shocking lack of knowledge about the location of the enemy in their immediate front, and were equally and blandly ignorant as well as careless as to what friendly units in the immediate vicinity were doing.

A Red tank company

commander in a certain village was questioned. No, he didn't know where the Blues were. His mission was to defend the village against attacks from the south and east, and he supposed the enemy to be directly to the south. (There was at least a battalion of his own division some

seven miles to the south.) He had no information concerning the antitank units in the village—neither as to their unit or as to their purpose. (They were mechanized cavalry whose mission was to defend the town against attack from the south and east—a little matter on which they and the tanks might well have gotten together.) He didn't know where the remainder of his regiment was, but when told that X Company was on the defensive to the east, he surmised that they might be protecting the regimental train. But he couldn't be sure.

MP's knew *nothing*. While men were posted to guide personnel of their own units when occupying a position, they were of little additional



Mired tanks surprised by Blue infantrymen, the first of whom is seen approaching in the foreground. Note the utter lack of local security on the part of the Reds.

and. A typical conversation between an artilleryman and such a guide ran as follows:

"Third Cavalry Brigade this way." "Did any artillery go with it?" "I can't say, sir." "Did any guns at all go down this road?" "I really don't know, sir." "Did any artillery of any description go through this road junction at any time during the past two hours?" "I'm sure I couldn't say, sir."

In the Zwolle engagement already mentioned, a Red medium tank battalion commander was ordered to deliver an attack to clear out the town. His attack began to roll, and found Red cavalry in full possession of the quarter he first entered. It was therefore decided to support the cavalry in storming a final center of resistance in a cemetery. In so doing, the tanks became so hopelessly intermixed with cavalry reserves that forward progress became impossible. The tanks

turned, in hopes of getting in a blow on the center of town, got mixed up in other armored columns already there, and before the battalion could be reorganized the war was over.

At least a partial excuse for the commander of the tank battalion seemed to lie in the absence of good general information, to no small extent due to the lack of adequate radio equipment.

There is no excuse for the type of mentality displayed by the tank company commander. Later this captain lost three tanks to the Blues. *With no guards out*, no guns manned or dismounted, these mired tanks were caught flat-footed by less than a squad of crack Blue infantrymen.

The actions of these Blues—Westerners and cagey Indians of a Guard division—were in striking contrast to the sloppy work of many other soldiers. After taking the Captain's tanks—along with a wrecker, a reporter and two radio announcers—they scored again on the regiment to which he belonged. Light tanks were sent down to clear the Blues out. They worked around a bend in the road with only a gesture at reconnaissance. Here they ran smack into a cleverly emplaced Blue .50 caliber antitank gun. A Blue lieutenant concealed in the grass on the high bank would observe each tank as it worked around the bend. By hand signals he would indicate to his gun squad the time to commence dragging their piece out of hiding in the woods, the path to take through the long grass, and



Blue infantry has out-bluffed this half-track platoon, scared them to they are making this terrible mistake of running directly across the road to mount their car in background. The Blues have a light machine gun with their forward platoon, and will get them all. Presently the half-track itself will come out to flee, and be nicked by the .50 caliber also with the advance point. With jeeps, 6x6's, etc., this Red force has about twelve times the fire power of the Blue Platoon, and has greater strength in rifles alone—for they have armored infantry with them.

the location of the forward tank. They would let the surprised tank have it, and crawl back into cover to await the next. In this manner two tanks were called out. All umpires agreed that in war a minimum of four would have been lost by blundering into this single gun and its handful of protecting riflemen.

In the course of the same afternoon, these Westerners accounted for a total of 3 half-tracks, 6 tanks and a horde of other vehicles and personnel. This feat was accomplished with a Blue loss of two .50 caliber antitank guns and a scattering of assessed casualties. The evident reason for success: headwork on the part of the officers, NCO's and men of the rifle companies which successively led the advance. Their skill (and ability to bluff) was such that it was never necessary for the leading platoon to call on the support platoons of their company.

By no means uncommon, this kind of work was often duplicated by units whose scouting and patrolling ability enabled them to maneuver or frighten out of position more powerful organizations whose ignorance, indifference and lack of skill left them open to such action.

While training alone is the remedy for most faults of inability, one wonders about devising some schemes to cure at least the outpost and information problem. The duties of MP's might be expanded to include the posting of guards along important roads rendered dangerous by



Typical machine gun emplacement for maneuvers—right out in the open. Incidentally, the position on the gun of the ammunition chest is not favored by the Infantry School. It is fixed to tripod only for AA use.

enemy action. In accordance with the natural limitations imposed by military activity and terrain (and not merely by military organization by corps and divisions) an intelligence network might be arranged so that, at key points, it would be possible to find out what was going on and where other units were.

Under present conditions, the vertical routing of intelligence puts such a lag on distribution that



A Blue Douglas attack bomber strafes assembled Red tanks and other vehicles without getting more than passing attention. This is the tank battalion assembling to "attack" Zwolle.

organizations operating on the same road and contiguous to a reporting unit will normally get those reports as forwarded by rear echelons far too late. Brigade and division S-2's were usually aware of the general situation, but were poor on knowledge of road conditions and on the immediate battle intelligence required by reinforcing and maneuvering elements. As we have seen, this especially pertains when units are utilizing roads and fronts crowded with cooperating divisions and detachments. It even applies when division commanders themselves are visiting forward echelons.* If there were more effort at constant lateral communication useful to regimental and battalion commanders, the actions of striking forces could be made more rapid and effective. A well-organized service, composed of messengers, MP's, radio, telephone, air observation and other facilities, would lighten the communications burden of combat forces, and working with them might considerably enhance the all-round entire efficiency of forces in their area.

The objection might well be posed that a special area ground and radio network would provide the enemy with much useful information. In reply, many disastrous incidents from our own military history and repeated maneuver experience, and finally the Allied fiascoes against the Germans may be cited. In contrast is the open use of radio, flares, rockets and air panels by the German Army. There is a strong argument in that the policy of secrecy and security is per se a conservative trend abnegating the spirit of the offensive which underlies our military doctrine and animates our Army. Indeed, if it is maintained that, given information, we shall not be able to act upon it and render it obsolete before the enemy can react, in so ruling we are undoubtedly assuming an attitude of defeatism.

Quite as surprising to newsgatherers as the handling of combat intelligence was the lack of thoroughness exhibited by the majority of troops. One would have thought that the news despatches and gory pictures of the European War would have instilled an anxiety to work hard and well at their new profession. But no. No care whatever was taken in emplacing machine guns to select real fields of fire, cover or proper concealment. Though generally maintaining safe intervals, truck convoys seldom halted to dismount and scatter when strafed by aircraft. Here and there anti-aircraft machine guns of convoys would be laid on the offending planes, but normally not. There was a pleasing and distinct improvement in camouflage discipline, but it is a far cry from the requirements laid down by engineers who coach reporters on camouflage stories.

Over the entire Army phase there was an atmosphere of unreal and indecent haste which seemed to compound ordinary errors and force many into doing, that they might not be left behind, what they might ordinarily avoid.

*The reader is reminded that three ranking British generals were so captured by the Germans in Libya recently.

This held even for air. At flying fields, seldom was even lip-service paid to reality as squadron commanders persisted in parking planes wing tip to wing tip, seeking servicing convenience and military precision rather than practice at dispersion. In view of the fact that this habit of lining 'em up has lost the Poles, the Dutch, the Belgians, the French, the Yugoslavs their air forces—and the Russians a good part of theirs if pictures tell the tale—practice of this sort was extremely alarming to the press. Crowded though the fields were, the need for rapid servicing ought not to have precluded the cultivation of good habits.

Not so noticeable as haste, but in many ways more significant, was the unreality of maneuvers where fire-power was concerned. Troops in contact with hostile forces will discover in a trice, come war, that they cannot advance across open fields against machine-gun fire, because in war there are no weak-willed umpires. Troops will learn to take cover and dig in, when now they make little pretense of so doing. But without Gen. McNair's idea of using live artillery ammunition as an object lesson in connection with training, it is difficult to see how the full realization of the tremendous destructiveness of artillery fire is to be brought home. In spite of the superhuman job done by artillery umpires, right now the lack of appreciation is appalling. Anyone who has seen demonstrations of time shell at Sill and glanced at casualty statistics of past wars must shudder at the careless exposure of movements and positions to artillery fire prevalent in the maneuvers. One is alarmed to see that commanders even went so far as to forget their own artillery and its tremendous value. In some cases—as in maneuvers past—it was left in march order on the road when it should have been supporting the effort of its division. Too often, except in more or less elite outfits like regular infantry, cavalry and armored divisions, the usefulness of forward artillery went unappreciated. Infantry was put to costly use where artillery would have won for nothing.

Almost worse than this ignoring of artillery was a widespread failure to react to air firepower. Since all the difference between security on one hand and practical annihilation and transport paralysis on the other lies in a few simple precautions, this is amazing. The appearance of a major general of cavalry should not be required, before engineer vehicles concentrated at a bridgehead disperse into neighboring woods. Neither should the wise security measures taken in a CP like Gen. Patton's so contrast with lackadaisical performances by some lower echelons as to make headquarters personnel appear almost freakish. As a practical lesson to officers, a demonstration of air bombardment and machine gunning was staged at Barksdale Field in the middle of the army phase. Ninety generals and selected juniors totaling 4,000 were invited. Because high winds retarded the schedule, many generals left before the conclusion of the show.



Overworked umpire received protests for allowing Blue advance. Even though he did his best to keep the Blues back, while he was ordering them to retire in one area they would come forward in another. Undoubtedly Blue infantry here had fine spirit, but their actions would in war have been productive of nothing but casualties.

All these points were of interest. But they were neither as fascinating nor as unexpected as a thought which these first large-scale maneuvers of our new Army have generated. The thought is this:

Following recognition of the high promise of the Army, critics have sought—as above—to enumerate the mistakes observed so that correction through future training may be accomplished. There has been much bloodthirsty talk, too. Dark hints are passed that heads



Artillery umpire's assistant indicating fire on bridge south of Zwolle. The Red half-tracks in the background are about to drive right through this fire to escape Blue cavalry which has worked in among them. It is laid down by 105-mm. howitzers in Zwolle.



A demonstration of camouflage was staged during the maneuvers at Esler Field, Camp Beauregard. Here men of the 21st Engineers (Avn) take their simulated cabbage patch across the runway. They constructed revetments which they had intended the Blue pursuit planes stationed at the field to use. Only after the greatest persuasion could the Air Corps be induced to utilize the camouflaged facilities.

shall fall right and left in the most approved *Alice in Wonderland* manner. Guard officers must go. Reserve officers are to get the sack. A thorough purge of the Regular list will occur immediately.

It is to be hoped that, having been rushed into an emergency which it has long warned against, the Army will not be hustled into anything that it has not pondered long and well. And thus comes the question: would such thought reach the conclusion that the majority of maneuver mistakes were not in themselves evils, but merely surface manifestations which would disappear when the root and source was located and removed?

The author is convinced that most maneuver errors are attributable to a few basic psychological factors, and that these should be made the target of intensive corrective effort. The great majority of these factors stem from the fact that the United States Army today is a civilian army.

The Regular—the soldier well-grounded in the profession of arms—is a rare phenomenon. Rarer still is the reserve or guard officer whose peacetime pursuits have permitted him to convert himself into the practical equivalent of a professional. Both types are submerged in a tremendous flood of civilian personnel. Inevitably these civilian soldiers must carry all before them, and, for a time at least, impose on the Army the behavior patterns of civilian life.

Civilian life in the United States is peculiar. Our prize idiosyncrasy is our famed aptitude for bustle and haste. Stranger still for an army where all should work together is that unfortunate democratic development: rugged individualism. This trait has made "mind your own business" a national rule, and daily causes citizens to neglect their civic duties and to tolerate unfair business practices not directly affecting them. Probably rugged individualism, like haste, is an outgrowth of that pushing business enterprise which has sought to place a premium on individualistic success of a materialistic nature. Truly our God is Mammon, and woe betide him who wastes his time or falls behind through assistance rendered to his fellow men.

The most recent American psychological development also seems to stem from this neglect of the concept of group service and solidarity. In seeking material advancement, American enterprise has discovered and developed advertising and sales techniques to the point where it is a simple matter to make an inferior product outsell a superior one.

The cumulative effect has been a lack of thoroughness in our people. The cagey man will try to push ahead with outward show; the dull will see no point in hard labor if comparative results are negative. In short, it is regrettable but true that neither business enterprise nor unionization has yet made positive contributions towards the democratic ideal of service—towards group action and consciousness; towards thoroughness in thought and deed; and towards rapid and methodical—but not hasty—action.

It must be acknowledged, of course, that the opposite should hold for the regular. He has sworn himself to the service of his fellow countrymen. Unlike the civilian soldier, much is to be expected of him. If he has so far forgotten his ideals and the standards of thought and workmanship inculcated by every military precept, he has betrayed his trust, and he should go.

Actually, the regular must absorb his own psychological patterns—those peculiar to the military profession and to the conditions under which the Army has labored during the past 20 years.

Under the former heading come some pretty common attitudes of mind. Like any tight organization of men, a regular force is as susceptible to clannishness as to esprit de corps. Clannishness has a tendency to develop into prejudice against those who do not belong: against the Guard and against the reserve and selectees. Worse, among officers it progresses into a secretiveness more congenial to a high school fraternity than to an organization built to create an army from military ignoramuses, and bred to the offensive spirit. We must face the facts: some of these evils do exist.

Unfortunately they have been compounded where they do pertain because of two decades of military neglect by a pacifistic public. Officers have been compelled to substitute theory and desk work for troop duty. Dearth of funds has caused them to waste time in accounting for every picayune little item. It is not surprising, then, that an officer who had to salvage for training purposes the wood and nails from furniture crates might suffer from habitual inability to think in the broad terms of modern war's vast wastage.

On comparing these attitudes of civilian and military minds with maneuver faults, it should be possible to see how they motivate almost—if not absolutely—all the errors previously listed. The tank company commander was a reserve officer—the crews of the Red half-tracks near Zwolle were selectees and new recruits. They were minding their own business, and not speaking until spoken to. So slack were their security precautions that the Blues could and did work in to defeat them. Haste and want of thoroughness is seen throughout. The good old military mind is to be found permeating intelligence, and in the line-up of planes on fields. Finally, the small-minded commander is betrayed in the officer who forgets about his artillery. And so it goes.

The solution might well be the institution of psychological drills which would instill the characteristics desired—at least in the junior officers and enlisted men. Once these drills had made the individual's mind and habits receptive to military training, the purely military program should be completed rapidly. There cannot be the slightest doubt but that the raw manpower the Army has today is the best an army ever had. It is not to be compared with regular enlisted personnel of the past 20 years, nor even with that of 1917-18. Having the advantage of rising educational standards, it is highly intelligent. With prejudices removed, it will easily absorb combat training because military action is simply logical action in any given situation.


To facilitate this plan—or even to facilitate the present program—the essential must be constant, clear answers to the implied question "Why?" during all phases of training and operations. The increasing trend to wards visual and pictorial instead of written instruction should be continued because it is quicker, less boring, and more self-

explanatory. The dryness should be removed from military instruction and especially from manuals, so that pupils may replace the longing for the end of instruction and study with the interest to ask the question "Why?"

In this the Germans have set us a strong precedent. It is ill-fitting that we should fall behind, and continue to treat junior officers and especially enlisted men as children. Conservative regulars and strutting reserve and guard officers must avoid maintaining their authority by pulling rank and social distinctions, and by trying to make a mystery out of their professional knowledge. Conduct of this nature is mortally resented by any intelligent person. Today it is foolish, for many enlisted men possess a general—if not a military—intellect and social position well above that of their superiors. A real leader is he who commands through character and professional excellence alone; an officer who develops and guides, but does not drive, his men.

To get the most out of Americans, it must be remembered that our form of government has developed a people who respect their leaders only when that respect is returned. To explain things to them is to gain their respect, their interest and their regard. In so doing one also provides that information which develops to a maximum our national characteristic of individual initiative. Since the fog of war imposes on armies a demand for isolated and independent action on every side, it is imperative that the soldier be developed to the fullest who, through asking "Why?" has become capable of acting individually yet in harmony with his neighbors seen or unseen, joined to them by a common mind and a common purpose.

The maneuvers have indicated that this type of person is rare. Yet he is the sort vitally needed not only as soldiers by the Army, but as a citizen by present day and post-war democracy. If the Army can convert the mass of civilians to conform to such a pattern, it will perform a high service to the country, and win for an intelligent military policy a respect that may well save us from future unpreparedness.



Signal Corps sound trucks supplied battle sounds for realism. (Photo by Dmitri Kessel.)



Lake Charles airport: note the concentration of trailers, the line-up of Navy Grumman fighters faced beyond with another line of Douglas dive-bombers. In the background is still another line-up of planes. Life photo.

Lessons from the Maneuvers

Extracts from the reports of Field Artillery official observers at the Second Army-First Army exercises

GENERAL

All operations in the maneuvers were decidedly affected by two factors: First, the preoccupation of all participants with tank and antitank features; and second, the terrain, which has few roads, little observation, and is heavily wooded.

AIR OBSERVATION

One observer reported that no battalion was located which had not requested air observation but only one battalion was found which actually received action on such request. The Air Corps performed an enormous number of missions, but it is not believed that they were useful to field artillery except in lengthening the effective range of harassing, interdiction and demolition fires. Any effect thus obtained, however, was not given as the result of field artillery commanders making requests for deepening of their fires. From the fact that air observation was requested, it is deduced that it was needed. From the fact that it was

not supplied, it is deduced that (1) there were more important missions; (2) Air Corps training would not permit air observation of field artillery fire; or (3) that the Air Corps is not extremely interested in putting their planes and pilots to such a use.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Artillery battalion commanders and umpires were well aware of the haulage problem involved in ammunition resupply; apparently they made every effort to have the actual haulage meet the theoretical expenditures. All battalion S-4's and at least one division ammunition officer felt that the Division Ammunition Office is unnecessary, serves no useful purpose for artillery, and is a definite bottleneck in resupply.

ANTITANK DEFENSE

Weapons were generally located in pairs and in depth. The field of fire was toward the enemy and was generally well chosen. Many instances were noted where field



75-mm. antitank gun commanding road and a part of the 37th Division Provisional AT Battalion. This is the gun shown from the front.



The same gun photographed from the rear. Life photos.

pieces were used for antitank defense on order of combat team commanders.

It is believed that the individual soldier has been thoroughly indoctrinated with the necessity and desire to seek and destroy the tank. He seems to have lost his fear of tanks now that he has seen them, and in some ways appears

to show a hatred of them, engendered in part by the fact that the tank umpires have allowed the tank most unusual liberties when opposing antitank guns.

As a whole the tank attacks were stopped whenever launched. That the terrain is unfavorable for tanks may account in part for this. Nevertheless the fact remains that the attacks were stopped by the use of organic artillery and antitank weapons.

Armored forces attacked habitually in the following order: A few motorcycles, a few scout cars, more motorcycles, tanks. Our troops do not meet this method of attack in the best fashion, according to one report. The present method is to fire at each vehicle as it comes up. This is objectionable on the following grounds:

a. The position of the antitank gun is disclosed prematurely.

b. The fire is directed at the tank at the time and place where the tank is the strongest. This is because the armament of the tank is designed to fire forward most efficiently; and the front armor of the tank is thickest.

c. The successful attack on one vehicle leaves a road block between the gun and the next target.

More effective fire could be delivered on tanks if the gun crews waited until after the vehicles had passed. The probable objection is that umpires will not assess tank losses if this procedure is followed.

Two things were especially noted concerning tank attacks during the maneuvers: (1) The use of artillery to support tanks was extremely limited. (2) Tanks, no matter how much effort is exerted, always work back toward roads when they encounter obstacles.

ORDERS

Warning orders were used extensively but in many

cases their improper use defeated their purpose, as the troops were alerted only to have the orders changed later. Many warning orders caused men to be mounted and material ready to be moved hours before they could be put on the road. Numerous statements were made that poor planning was the rule rather than the exception.

Operations maps and overlays were being used. Fragmentary oral orders were in full use by the lower units. But in some cases the orders issued were indefinite and *too* fragmentary. As an example, the order issued by an antitank battalion commander to one of his companies consisted of the following statement, "Get on the road and get going." When the company commander asked as to the destination and mission, he received as an answer a repetition of the foregoing command.

COMMUNICATION

Poor results in telephone communication were chiefly due to poor technique in wire laying. It was the old story of lines crossing roads with no attempt made to protect them, leaving wires on road shoulders, laying them too tight, rough handling during recovery of wire, and so on.

Although many radios were successfully used, the troops claim that the sets, especially the 194's, were not good enough to perform the missions.

FIRE DIRECTION

In general, units were employing the technique taught at the Field Artillery School. However, more training of the FD teams is needed. The fire-direction center appeared to be the only operating installation at the battalion CP. Installations were concentrated, and were not dug in. No systematic arrangement of equipment appeared to be in use. Firing charts were in every case separate from the situation map. This may account for the fact that in one division 18 per cent of the fires marked on its leading elements were fired by its own artillery. The function of the S-2 and S-3 sections, except with regard to fire direction, appear to have been neglected. Suitable situation maps frequently were lacking.

FORWARD OBSERVATION

Because of the nature of the terrain, forward observation was the most successful means of delivering observed fires. An improvement has been made in the use of more experienced officers for this important duty.

Many battery commanders—and in one case even a battalion commander—acted as forward observer. The battery forward observers were ahead of the infantry battalion commander, and usually right in the front. Communication by radio was common; however, many batteries made arrangements to lay wires to the forward observers. Forward observers were active in making the local situation clear to their own troops, but there is still a need for teaching these details that they have auxiliary intelligence functions. Fires requested by forward observers were more reliable than those called for by liaison officers.

GUNNERY

In general, survey was by battalion. Data furnished by the division artillery headquarters or by the observation battalion seldom arrived in time to be of use initially. The type of survey performed was influenced by the heavily wooded terrain.

None of the photos, maps, or mosaics distributed were made during the maneuvers.

A great amount of confusion existed at times as to the capabilities of the various weapons. In one case 75-mm. guns "fired" on targets eight miles distant.

LIAISON

Command and combat liaison were employed, but not to the extent considered desirable. More and better artillery support would have resulted from closer command liaison. Artillery and combat teams sometimes marched without sending a liaison officer of any kind to the combat team commander. This may account in part for the



A message center about as well-concealed as an airplane beacon.

Life

fact that many supported commanders were not really "artillery conscious."

MOTOR MOVEMENTS

Many movements observed showed evidence of faulty prior planning and reconnaissance. Evidently the use of the roads was not coordinated by higher staffs; as an example, on one occasion where two divisions had been ordered to move by the same road, one element of one division was delayed ten hours at the IP. On another occasion during a night move one division crossed its own columns and occasioned a delay of eight hours in the launching of its attack ordered by a higher commander.

The road discipline of the individual soldier and officer is noticeably poor, particularly at halts. No halted column was observed in which some individuals were not on the left of the column and in many cases well out toward the center of the road. Halted columns seem to rely more on a sentry at the head and tail of columns to slow down approaching vehicles than on proper discipline to protect themselves and passing vehicles.

It is believed that the artilleryman may as well resign himself to the use of all of his vehicles for the shuttling of infantry. All type vehicles within the artillery were used for that purpose.

Many instances were observed of vehicles being overloaded, driven at excessive speeds and generally being abused, but some faults must be charged to higher commanders who required prolonged and excessive use of vehicles with insufficient opportunity for caretaking.

It is to be noted that the operation of motor vehicles has improved materially. There is still much to be desired along the lines of caretaking, cleaning, driver maintenance, tightening, drivers' inspections and servicing. In short, the drivers now know how to drive, but do not know how to take care of the transportation. The small number of accidents was a great surprise. Most that did occur could be laid directly to (1) driver fatigue, (2) blackout driving under the most difficult conditions, and (3) carelessness.

There is a tendency on the part of the troops to overload light vehicles and underload medium or heavy vehicles when shuttling.

The use of traction devices was not prevalent. The practice of winching to hard roads and staying on them was the means usually employed to the exclusion of other forms of field expedients.

Maintenance was poor. Although most motor officers knew the general requirements for motor maintenance there was not enough effort and technical knowledge to insure proper maintenance. From personal observation this failure started with the driver and continued throughout the echelons of maintenance up to the 4th. There was one exception to this statement found in a third echelon set-up. The reasons for this failing are believed to be:

- (1) Training of maintenance personnel was inadequate.
- (2) Maintenance was subordinated to such an extent that it was forgotten, due to more obvious needs such as:
 - (a) Shuttling.
 - (b) Supply.
 - (c) Cleanliness.
 - (d) Training of details and firing batteries.
- (3) The time necessary to perform maintenance is not made available by commanders.
- (4) There is a dearth of technically qualified motor officers, motor sergeants and mechanics.
- (5) The army is not motor conscious.
- (6) Abuses and faulty maintenance of motor vehicles are condoned. (This is one of the greatest sources of poor maintenance.)

In general, the 1940-41 vehicles now in use are superior vehicles. There are many who question particular vehicle characteristics but the fact is that in spite of maintenance difficulties mentioned above, the vehicles functioned. Foreign officers (British) present at the maneuvers were unanimous in their praise of all vehicles observed. They frankly admitted that our transport is the best they have seen bar none.

Notice of Annual Meeting, U. S. Field Artillery Association

In compliance with Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution, notice is hereby given that the Executive Council has fixed 5:30 PM, Monday, December 15, 1941, as the time of the annual meeting of the Association to be held at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D. C.

The business to be disposed of will be the selection of six members of the Executive Council; voting on proposed amendments to the Constitution (as printed in each issue of the *JOURNAL* beginning with June, 1941); and the transaction of such other business as may properly come before the meeting.

Proxy cards are being sent out to all active members of the Association within the continental limits of the United States, as required by the Constitution, and it is desired that they be returned promptly. Nominations may be made on the proxy cards or from the floor of the meeting.